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ABSTRACT
As a concept, the CubeSat class of satellites is over 15 years old. The first CubeSat satellites were launched in 2003
and a few more in 2006. In recent years, CubeSats have proliferated at an astonishing rate. What started as a largely
academic exercise has taken on much greater significance, with commercial entities gearing up to produce vast
constellations of the small but capable spacecraft. Amidst all the hype one fact tends to get overlooked: CubeSats do
not have a great record of mission success. This presentation provides simple, actionable recommendations that
should improve the likelihood of mission success for future CubeSat development projects. The recommendations
were gleaned from a study across academic, commercial and government organizations engaged in the design and
development of miniature spacecraft. These organizations generously shared their processes, circumstances, results,
and lessons learned; they also shared their current processes and philosophies on design, testing, and mission
assurance. The results highlighted a number of important themes and issues, all of which formed the basis for the
eight recommendations. Most of the recommendations can be tailored and implemented without much cost, and
many seem to be common sense—though the study team found that few CubeSat developers followed them all. This
paper specifically looks at the research process, the recurring themes and the eight recommendations to improve
mission success of CubeSats.
INTRODUCTION

address this topic. The MAIW is a community of
practice that brings together the U.S. Space Industry to
explore and document best practices and common
approaches to mission assurance. 2017 was the 10th
year of the workshop.

As the rate of CubeSat launches increases each year, the
community is seeing more diversity in the types of
missions being developed by industry, academia, and
government. Each of these missions have different
expectations that have impacts to testing, risk
management, and program oversite.1,2 What is common
among the missions is that mission success is important
and there are greater expectations that missions will
succeed. So how does the community achieve greater
mission success and still follow the CubeSat ideal of
low-cost, off-the-shelf parts, and agile development
cycles?

This paper describes the methodology and process of
the study, presents the themes distilled from a
compilation of lessons learned gathered from the
interviews, and proposes eight recommendations that
will help the CubeSat community improve mission
success.
METHODOLOGY AND PROCESS
The research methodology for the study consisted of a
straight forward process (Figure 1) of research
preparation, collecting data, analyzing the data, and
publishing results to help the CubeSat community
improve probability of mission success.

This was the problem statement for the study,
“Improving Mission Success of CubeSats” under the
2017 Mission Assurance Improvement Workshop
(MAIW). The study team consisted of 13 members
across government and industry that came together to
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Research
Preparation
• Literature search
• Questionnaire development
• Wish list of organizations to
interview

Analysis
Process
• Analyze data, identify
themes, and
formulate
recommendations

customer participate in these reviews? Did you
have independent reviewers participating?

Interview
Process
• Contact organizations,
schedule interviews
• Dry run interviews
• Conduct interviews,
generate interview
summaries

Product
Generation
• Initial product
• Subject matter
expert review
• Final product

Figure 1: A systematic, straightforward process was
followed for this study

What type of reviews do you perform before
approving a detailed design (mechanical,
electrical or software)? Do you perform any
independent peer reviews?

8.

What performance analyses were done? What
tests were done?

9.

What test or process do you consider essential
to CubeSat success? What would be the
second most important test / process? What
test or process would you eliminate if you
could? What did you think was not valueadded?

These questions were devised to gather some statistical
data, but more importantly the team made a number of
the questions open ended to spark candid conversations
about experiences and lessons learned. This proved to
be the most valuable information collected.

Research Preparation
Preparation began with a literature survey of papers and
presentations about CubeSat successes and failures. In
addition to understanding historical problems, the team
wanted to ensure the MAIW topic was not replicating
existing research, which was verified. This research
also helped development of a questionnaire that was
used to interview CubeSat organizations. Dry run
interviews within the team were used to improve the
questionnaire and practice for the many interviews that
were planned. The final set of questions used were the
following:
1.

7.

The team identified 57 candidate organizations from
academia, industry and government with CubeSat
development experience. In the end however, the team
held only 23 interviews (Table 1): MAIW process
deadlines and team personnel availability precluded
more interviews. Discussions with foreign entities were
avoided, due to ITAR constraints.
Table 1: Organizations Interviewed

How many CubeSats has your organization
built? Out of those built, how many have
flown? Were the missions successful, where
mission success is defined as achievement of
the desired mission performance over intended
design life?

Academia (10)
California
Polytechnic State
University

Describe one (or more) of your recent CubeSat
missions. Was it successful? What do you
think contributed most to its success? If not
successful, what would you do differently?

Georgia Institute of
Technology

3.

What is the experience level of your team?

4.

Do the team members change over often or are
the team members consistent for long periods
of time?

5.

What were the customer expectations and risk
tolerance level (low, medium, high)? Did their
expectations change with time?

6.

Please list the major reviews that occurred for
the project (i.e. PDR, CDR, etc.) Did your

Montana State
University
Saint Louis
University
University of
Michigan
University of
Southern
California
United States
Naval Academy
U.S. Air Force
Academy
Utah State
University

2.
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Industry (5)
Atmospheric &
Space Technology
Research
Associates, LLC
(ASTRA)
Blue Canyon
Technologies
The Boeing
Company
Millennium Space
Systems
Planetary
Resources

Government/
FFRDC/UARC (8)
The Aerospace
Corporation
Air Force Research
Laboratory
Massachusetts
Institute of
Technology Lincoln
Laboratory
NASA Ames
Research Center
NASA Goddard
Space Flight Center
NASA Wallops Flight
Facility
NAVY Space and
Naval Warfare
Systems Command
Space Dynamics
Laboratory
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Interview Process

followed the MAIW approval and public release
processes.

The MAIW team split up into smaller sub-teams to
efficiently schedule and execute the interviews and
follow-up, as necessary. When the interviews were
scheduled, the sub-teams explained objectives and the
process, and provided the list of questions well in
advance. The sub-teams introduced the team members
participating in the interview. The MAIW team made
sure that participants understood that:

INTERVIEW STATISTICS

•

We would not ask, nor did we want to receive,
any proprietary information

•

None of the raw data would be released
outside of the topic team

The interview results were analyzed to help the
CubeSat community improve probability of mission
success. A top level statistical analysis provided some
insight during this process. The following data is
primarily from the interviews, with minor additions
from online sources. “Lessons learned” were
volunteered by the interviewees. Both quantitative and
qualitative data was obtained and assessed. Responses
to the qualitative questions often included discussions
that addressed on-orbit anomalies and potential
corrective actions.

•

The "aggregate" data and analysis from the
interviews will be made available in a
publicly releasable report

For purposes of this assessment, the satellites were
segregated into two size groups:

The organization being interviewed was encouraged to
bring everyone needed who could answer the questions
provided. The MAIW lead assigned to that interview
directed the questioning. At least two MAIW team
members were present for each interview, many times
there were three or more. Each person wrote notes and
after the interview concluded, the lead would compile
the notes into a single account. That final summary
was sent to the interviewee for approval and correction.
The approved and corrected notes were archived.

1.

Group 1 = 1U (1.33 kg) to 27U (36 kg)
Picosats/Nanosats

2.

Group 2 = >27U to 200 kg
Microsats/Smallsats

The development, launch, and on-orbit experiences for
Group 1 spanned a time frame from 2002 to 2016. The
Smallsats in Group 2 include programs from the 1980s
and 1990s.
Basic Data Set

Most interviews were performed via telecon, however
whenever it was convenient, face-to-face conversations
occurred. In addition to the interview questions, the
conversations often led to additional discussions to
further understand processes, ground test issues, and
on-orbit anomalies.

Figure 2 summarizes the satellites being built, awaiting
launch or that have flown by the 23 organizations
interviewed. This is the basic data set used in the
analysis. The data is segregated by the two group sizes,
as listed above. Because the development process is
valuable to this study, we included satellites that were
currently being built in the statistics with those already
built and launched. Of the 242 satellites that have been
built or were being built at the time of the interview,
only 95 arrived in orbit and 18 were lost during launch.

Analysis Process
The interviews resulted in 415 pages of information.
This was distilled in a spreadsheet where we identified
common themes and theme categories. The MAIW
then met in one location to reach a final consensus: 40
distinct common trends that fell into 8 theme categories
and subsequently produced 8 recommendations on how
to improve mission success of CubeSats.
Report Generation
A draft report was generated by the MAIW team and
reviewed by a panel of 17 Subject Matter Experts
(SMEs).
The SMEs were selected from the
interviewees and others with action authority in the
field.
This process resulted in 190 actionable
comments that were adjudicated with the SMEs and
incorporated into the final report. The final report
Venturini
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Mission Status

out of the 94 satellites that were discussed and various
levels of root cause assessments were performed.
These discussions in many cases identified multiple
contributors to the problems as shown in Figure 5. It
was also noted that if more ground testing had been
performed, it could have identified some or all of the
other issues.

Figure 3 summarizes the interview respondent
assessments of mission success for their satellites that
achieved orbit. One can observe that the larger class
Smallsats have been more successful than the CubeSat
group.
1U – 27U Size

5%

>27U Size

5%

10%

8%

20%

65%

87%

DOA (No contact)

Partial Mission

Early Loss

Full Mission

Figure 5: 27 anomalies were discussed during
interviews
THEMES

Figure 3: Mission status by size

During the interviews, many themes emerged. These
were concepts, practices, and observations made by the
interviewees which stood out, either due to their
pertinence or their frequency. Many of the themes were
common across industry, academia, and government,
and most of the themes are broadly applicable to all
missions regardless of mission resources or success
criteria. To preserve confidentiality, the themes and
observations are not attributed to companies or
agencies.

We compared our Group 1 CubeSat data set (94
CubeSats) with a CubeSat database (288 CubeSats)
developed through research performed by Dr.
Swartwout at St Louis University as of Spring 2017
(Figure 4)3. Some observations include:
•

Rough correlation exists for launch failures
and early loss categories

•

Many more DOA (Dead on Arrival) cases are
observed in the larger dataset

•

The interviewees appear to have more partial
and full successes, possibly due to these
organizations having more experience with
lessons learned from multiple missions

MAIW Interviews: 94
Picosats/Nanosats Launched

1%

Launch Failures

19%

10%

# Picosats/Nanosats with launch
failures

14%

DOA

4%
8%

53%

Dr Swartwout Database: 288
CubeSats Launched (Ref. [6])

# Picosats/Nanosats - DOA (No
contact)

Early
Loss
# Picosats/Nanosats

17%
22%

- Early Loss

Partial
Mission- Partial
#Picosats/Nanosats
Mission

16%

# Picosats/Nanosats
Full
Mission - Full Mission

26%

10%

Prelaunch
Unknown

Figure 4: Comparison to related CubeSat research

Theme #1: Setting the Purpose and Vision of the
Mission
Different agencies have different visions for the
CubeSats they build. Some see them as educational
tools for students, some see them as “lab benches in
space,” and some see them as capable platforms for
potentially complex missions. Several interviewees
encountered mismatches between the resources of the
Launch Failures
developer and the expectations of the customer. In
DOA
some cases, the customer’s expectations were out of
Early Loss
Partialline
Mission with the funding and resources available to the
Full Mission
developer. In other cases, the developer was overly
Prelaunch
optimistic about what could be accomplished given the
Unknown
resources available. “At first, we had very simple
expectations. Then as the requirements changed, we got
in over our heads,” one commented.

Anomaly Discussions

For academic institutions, student education is often the
primary measure of mission success; while a successful
launch and on-orbit campaign is always desired, getting
to delivery is considered the major achievement. Many

During the course of the interviews many of the
respondents described anomalies and offered their
opinions on the root causes. There were 27 anomalies
Venturini
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academic developers will launch regardless of
readiness. As one such developer stated, “we’d rather
take a 5% chance of it working, than a 0% chance of it
ever launching.” Because of this, industry observers
must be careful when interpreting success rates.
CubeSats have relatively high failure rates in part
because such developers are willing to take big risks.

value of the major reviews was debated. Most
academic institutions thought it helpful to expose
students to industry practices and several interviewees
felt that the major reviews helped identify disconnects,
especially with external partners. Interviewees also
pointed out that major reviews sometimes provide
useful deadlines to drive design decisions to closure.
On the other hand, major reviews take resources away
from engineering – something that is hard to tolerate in
low-resource programs. The use of less formal, but
rigorous peer reviews was considered more valueadded. Respondents noted that review style is not
always up to the program. Review approach and
formality are sometimes dictated by the customer and
interviewees recommended working with the customer
to understand their expectations and come to a mutually
agreeable review strategy.

Many interviewees commented on the negative
implications of “scope creep.” One interviewee
discussed how a simple-seeming science change to a
mission led to redesign of the electronics board, noting
that “little decisions early on make a big impact at the
end.” Interviewees recommended establishing (and
defending) a minimum baseline mission and having a
de-scope plan in place should circumstances require it.
Two academic institutions credited their strong systems
engineering approach—and extreme resistance to scope
creep—for their mission success. “Limit complexity,
and test extensively,” one stated. There is a need to
define upfront what mission success actually means to
all parties, and to communicate this to key stakeholders
from the beginning to the end of the program.4,5,6

Nearly every academic institution—and several
government and industry agencies—commented on the
“time crunch factor” in CubeSat schedules. Launches
will typically not wait for a CubeSat and teams were
often overly optimistic on design timelines. This put
extreme pressure on the latter half of the schedule,
including assembly and test—something that nearly
every institution considers critical. Several institutions
attributed their on-orbit failures to incomplete testing
due to insufficient time and recommended dedicating
half of a development schedule to testing from the
outset.

Theme #2: Establishing the Program Structure
Team composition, system engineering practices, and
review approach varied among CubeSat developers and
from academia to industry. Not unexpectedly, academic
institutions had the highest team member turnover rate
due to graduation. For academic teams in particular,
having an experienced mentor was important. From the
limited interview data, it appears that among academic
institutions, the more experienced the mentor, the
greater the success rate. Many mentors came from
industry and applied the lessons learned from industry
to their academic programs.

Theme #3: The Risk Process
Many respondents felt that a good risk process is even
more important for CubeSat missions than for larger,
Class A missions. Risk-based mission assurance allows
programs with low resources to get the most “bang for
the buck.” “You don’t have the resources to focus on
everything,” said one interviewee. “Pick and choose
based on risk, not on gut feel or emotion.” One
interviewee advocated determining the “cost to riskreduction ratio” of design, integration, and test
activities. Specifically, when choosing which analyses
to do, tests to perform, and processes to implement,
CubeSat developers should consider the ratio between
programmatic risk (increased cost, delayed schedule)
and technical risk (on-orbit failure). Teams make the
most effective use of limited resources by focusing on
the work with the lowest programmatic to technical risk
ratios.

Many interviewees felt that process documentation was
more important, not less, with inexperienced teams, and
with teams that turnover frequently. One academic
institution with a good success record stated, “We use
formal shop orders, good as-built discipline, and good
as-tested documentation. These help with transferring
knowledge between students during turnover.”
Similarly, interviewees noted that documentation
becomes more important as teams and companies growin-size, to maintain corporate culture through changing
times. One industry developer noted that as the
company grew, “We started to lose institutional
knowledge through confusion.”

Respondents called out flight software as a particularly
risky area. For CubeSats, flight software is often the
most complex subsystem on the satellite and is
notoriously difficult to analyze. Interviewees repeatedly
stressed the importance of early functional testing of
flight software. Robust safe modes and the ability to

Most of the respondents followed the typical
government/industry review cycle (Preliminary Design
Review, Critical Design Review, etc.), though in many
academic cases, these reviews were tied to the
academic calendar, rather than project milestones. The
Venturini
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patch or reprogram software on orbit, also helps reduce
risk.

organization created an entire laboratory devoted to
realistic day-in-the-life testing, including a GPS
simulator, star field simulator, and a Helmholtz cage.
Even if such resources are not available, organizations
can demonstrate much of the on-orbit functionality of a
CubeSat through day-in-the-life testing.

Theme #4: Design and Analysis
For CubeSats, it is particularly important to design for
simplicity and robustness. The funding and timelines
required for complicated designs do not fit the
stereotypical “rapid and inexpensive” CubeSat
paradigm. Tri-fold wings, expensive payloads, capable
pointing, directional antennas, and other complex
systems, all add risk to CubeSat missions. Simple
designs, by contrast, have fewer failure modes and are
more likely to be achievable within the scope of a
typical CubeSat program. Interviewees recommended
keeping deployables simple, having minimal or no
attitude control, and sticking to low data and power
requirements to improve the chances of mission
success.

One organization that works extensively with university
satellites recommends four tests following assembly,
and before environmental testing:

CubeSat parts are mostly commercial and not designed
for the space radiation environment. Interviewees
mentioned that watchdog timers and other fail-safe
devices that reset components automatically, helped
their CubeSat missions succeed. CubeSat missions
typically use non-radiation-hardened parts, which can
latch-up. “Have many ways to reset the satellite,”
recommends one respondent. Some developers reset
their on-orbit missions every 24 hours as a
precautionary measure.

A command execution test, where all
commands are sent to the satellite and checked
for correct execution;

•

A day-in-the-life test, where a typical 24-hour
period on-orbit is simulated;

•

An end-to-end communications test, where the
ground system is used to command the
spacecraft over radio frequency links;

•

A complete power system charge cycle, where
the battery is discharged to its full depth of
discharge through satellite operations and then
recharged using the solar panels.

These four tests demonstrate basic functionality and can
typically be conducted without elaborate test
equipment.

A CubeSat’s small size makes it hard to de-integrate,
repair, and re-integrate. Furthermore, most CubeSats
undergo little to no subsystem-level testing. As a
result, issues are usually discovered while testing the
fully assembled satellite. “A lot of time was wasted on
integration and de-integration… if something needed to
change, we had to take the whole thing apart,” observed
one developer. Designing for disassembly and using a
larger form factor than needed can keep these risks low.
One university deliberately built a 1.5U satellite into a
3U form factor – the extra space allowed for easier
assembly and re-work. Another bought a separate set of
boards, conducted any needed repairs on the bench, and
then replaced the entire board on the CubeSat, rather
than disassembling the CubeSat and repairing the flight
board directly.

Some academic institutions debated the value of
thermal vacuum (TVAC) testing. Thermal vacuum
chambers are expensive equipment, and often not
present in a university CubeSat laboratory.
Furthermore, TVAC testing is time consuming to set up
and difficult to execute properly. Developers without
access to a TVAC facility relied solely on ambientpressure thermal testing. They believed that functional
testing at temperature extremes provided nearly the
same value, for less cost. However, TVAC testing
accurately emulates the space environment, including
the absence of air, which eliminates convective cooling.
One respondent observed that testing in TVAC would
have found a mission crippling error.
Another
respondent did find an error and corrected it prior to
shipment – that error also would have ended the
mission.

Theme #5: Test, Test, Test – the Importance of
Testing

Deployment testing was also debated; while nearly
everyone agreed that critical deployables should be
tested in flight-like conditions, many pointed out that
these tests can be hard to conduct. Some deployment
mechanisms cannot be reset or can only be used a
limited number of times, which makes it hard to test
them extensively. The root cause of several CubeSat
failures has been attributed to deployments.

Every organization interviewed emphasized the
importance of testing, especially full-system functional
testing. When asked what test they considered the most
critical to CubeSat success, most organizations pointed
to end-to-end functional testing. “Immediately directly
useful are end-to-end functional demonstrations starting
as early as possible,” stated one respondent. One
Venturini
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The lack of time for testing, and the tendency for test
time to be squeezed to make a launch date, was
frequently re-emphasized, as was the importance of
software testing.

CubeSat standard components are commercial and not
designed specifically for space. Interviewees also
recommended overstocking spare parts and using part
derating to improve margin.7,8 Spare parts will allow
additional targeted component testing and protect
schedule if a part fails during system-level tests.

Theme #6: Common CubeSat Failures
During the interviews, the team collected a list of
common CubeSat failures and subsystems worthy of
more attention. These included:
•

The communication system. Not only were
communication system failures common (and
typically mission-ending), it was hard for
CubeSat developers to find a good ground
segment.

•

The power system. Interviewees noted that the
actual performance of purchased power
systems did not always match specifications.
They also warned that power systems should
be tested in their intended configuration.

•

Deployables, such as solar panels and
antennas. Burn-wire systems are sensitive to
workmanship and are not easily resettable.
Testing deployables like-you-fly is difficult
and time-consuming.

Theme #8: Launch is a Significant Driver
Launch schedule pressure is a major risk driver on
CubeSats and it ripples into much of the decisionmaking during a typical program. CubeSat programs
are often secondary rideshares, with little flexibility in
the launch date. At the end of the program, the
important system-level testing often gets “crunched”
because CubeSats must meet a launch delivery
deadline. The result is incomplete or inadequate testing.
“We need to spend more time in AI&T [assembly,
integration, and test],” one developer said, “but we
can’t afford to miss the launch. So, we ship at the
delivery date, regardless of maturity.”
Launch delays are also a problem. In one case, a failed
solar array passed all testing, but there was a long-time
delay and significant handling of the spacecraft before
launch. It is believed that this led to a broken
mechanism. Another government organization’s
satellite sat unpowered on the International Space
Station for seven months before deployment. It is
believed that the delay degraded their batteries. Launch
delays can also put pressure on budgets and schedules,
encouraging customers to add more capability. One
industry developer uses a “deliver to self” paradigm,
instead of “delivering to a launch provider.”

These subsystems, therefore, warrant greater attention
and analysis.
Theme #7: Parts
Documentation

Quality,

Availability,

and

A number of interviewees brought up issues with
CubeSat parts and subsystems. CubeSat missions
typically use commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) standard
assemblies and components, due to their low cost and
lead time. These have sometimes proven unsuitable for
the expected space environment and the performance of
COTS components does not always match
specifications. Inexperienced CubeSat developers do
not have the history to know when additional testing is
advisable and which parts are trustworthy.

CubeSats are typically required to follow stringent “do
no harm” guidelines. Integrators therefore require
multiple-redundant inhibit systems designed to keep a
CubeSat from powering up before launch. “Inhibits are
… single-point failures with unknown reliability. A $26
set of parts can take down your whole mission,”
observed one interviewee. Another pointed out that, “A
Class A mission would never put in a switch they
couldn’t work around.”

CubeSat standard assemblies and components are often
poorly or inaccurately documented. “It’s hard to find
information on COTS parts,” stated one developer.
“They come with poor user manuals and teams are
learning as they go.” In many cases, testing was
necessary to flesh out the differences between the
specification sheets and reality. “Even though the
CubeSat
philosophy
tends
to
de-emphasize
documentation,” one interviewee stated, “having up-todate vetted documentation from vendors, delivered on
time and with the proper revisions, would make a big
difference.”

Launch vehicle environments for CubeSats are often
severe. As a secondary payload that is intended to be
no threat to the primary payload, the dispensers are
relegated to places on the rocket away from the fairing.
Some launch environments are significantly worse than
others, and CubeSats rarely know until after CDR what
launch vehicle they will use. Accounting for various
launch vehicle vibration levels can result in overdesign
and wasted effort. One academic satellite designed to
the expected vibration environment, and then was given
a new, higher environment from the launch vehicle; retesting was challenging.
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RECOMMENDATIONS

plan, to make up for future time and funding shortfalls.
Budget estimates should have significant margins
because the development teams are usually young and
therefore without prior satellite development experience
to correct for the misperception that CubeSats are easy
to realize because they are small.

From the themes and lessons learned, the team
produced eight recommendations. They are intended to
improve the success of CubeSat developers. In this
section, each recommendation is offered along with an
explanation about why it is important and how it might
be implemented effectively.
The degree of
implementation correlates to the amount of risk retired.
Although recommendations may appear to be general
knowledge and common sense, it was rare to find a
team that followed all actions. Most of these can be
implemented with minimal increased cost to a program,
while moving the program towards higher levels of
mission success.

Recommendation #2: Conduct risk-based mission
assurance. Perform a risk assessment at the beginning
of the program and review it regularly to prioritize
analyses, tests, reviews, and activities.
The amount of mission assurance applied to a project
affects its cost. Mission assurance techniques exist for
all phases of a project from part selection standards to
how reviews are conducted. Any activity adds cost, so
the goal is to identify those that provide the most value.
At the end of the project, arguably the most important
goal is that the satellite functions well. At all stages of
the project, the greatest concerns to achieving that end
should be listed, ranked and worked. In short, ask
yourself throughout the program, "What keeps me up at
night?" The answer becomes your risk list and the basis
for the project schedule. This directs resources to the
problems that are front-and-center, but admittedly at the
expense of the more subtle or latent ones.

Recommendation #1: Define your scope, goals,
and success criteria at program start. Justify your
ability to complete it within the available time, budget,
and resources. During project life cycle, defend it
aggressively against growth.
Scope creep is a problem on all missions, but for
CubeSats, which are smaller and typically more cost
and resource constrained, there is even less room to
accommodate changes. A project is sold to customers
as a capability for a certain cost – a certain vision and
expectation are transferred and must be recorded as a
governing document. As a project evolves and risks are
discovered, the costs become more defined and the
price grows inevitably more expensive.

It is prudent to have an awareness of good mission
assurance practices. Some are easy to implement if the
right culture is nurtured. But, in a cost- and scheduleconstrained project, a risk-based mission assurance plan
directs programs with limited resources where to
allocate those resources and where to cut back.

Interviewees stressed that CubeSat developers – and
sometimes their customers – tend to be overly
optimistic about what these small, low-cost platforms
can achieve and unrealistic about the difficulty in
realizing their desired functionality and expected
reliability. CubeSat customers are new to the satellite
business and will not appreciate that cost increases
always occur. In contrast, experienced teams, before
the ink from their signature on the contract is dry,
immediately look for ways to reduce scope to hedge
against the certain cost growth - they never add scope,
without a contract increase. Therefore, learning from
years of evolutionary behavior development that has,
not surprisingly, been reflected in the responses to this
survey, it is recommended that project leadership and
customers define scope, goals, and success criteria at
the start of a program and stop there, unless additional
funding is added to the contract.

Recommendation #3: Plan for ample Integration,
Verification, and Test (IV&T) time. Baseline IV&T to
be 1/3 to 1/2 of the overall schedule and stick to that.
Throughout the survey, running out of time and money
was a constant theme. This recommendation is a ruleof-thumb that, if applied, will alleviate a common
project management failure mode. The implementation
of a firewall of budget and schedule starting at IV&T
also flows backwards: it forces the team to modify and
potentially de-scope project goals, before design
complexity starts to endanger the IV&T time. The start
of a new project is arguably its most interesting time
period. There are a lot of possibilities of how to
achieve the end goals and about how the program will
be executed. Narrowing down those possibilities is an
art form and must be bounded by a time and or budget
limit. If this is not done, then there is less of both for
the integration phase, where all problems ultimately
come to light, at the baseline functional test that is
required before environmental testing can start.

It’s critical that the funding match the desired
complexity, reliability, and purpose of the mission, and
vice-versa. During the project lifecycle, the contractor
project management must defend the original scope
against growth and in addition, if the customer does not
have financial reserves, then have a graceful descope
Venturini
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During the study interviews, almost all developers
commented on how the “time crunch factor”
contributed to on-orbit failure. The IV&T schedule
period can arguably be defined as the point at which all
the hardware is available and working. Projects should
start testing hardware as it becomes available, as
components,
subassemblies
and
groups
of
subassemblies. This type of development is called “test
often and test early.” The point is to remain skeptical
that things will work and to test whatever can be tested,
at the soonest time it can be.

It is no surprise that a team with prior experience in all
phases of producing a satellite has a greater chance of
seeing the effort run smoothly, meeting performance,
financial and schedule goals.
However, such
experience is not always available. The study found
that successful academic teams had experienced leads
and mentors as part of the team. Typically, the satellite
leads were students that had worked on a satellite in
their early years, with mentors who had good training in
the art of systems engineering and program
management. Successful academic satellite teams
sought outside participation in their peer reviews and
for problem resolution. Those outside experts filled in
the team’s knowledge gaps.

Recommendation #4: Design for simplicity and
robustness. Assume designs will fail and then prove
they will work. Design the satellite for easy assembly
and disassembly. Have respectable margins, robust
safe modes, few deployables, graceful performance
degradation, and the ability to perform satellite resets.

The industry staffing paradigm is different. Industry
teams typically have good continuity from project to
project. Also, industry teams can hire the skills that
they specifically need. However, industry teams were
less likely to seek outside experts for peer reviews and
problem resolution because of contracting and
proprietary knowledge challenges. This situation is
compounded because the low cost of CubeSat projects
limits the team size and knowledge gaps are inevitable.
To remedy this, successful industry teams had a larger
pool of employees whom they temporarily borrowed
for tough issues. Therefore, solving unique problems or
assessing the completeness of a design is easier with a
wide pool of participants.
Academia can take
advantage of the outside talent pools more easily than
industry. Industry should consider working legal and
contracting issues to simplify bringing experts into their
project as needed.

Design problems have many possible solutions. In
early trade studies, various parameters are compared,
and the best solution is selected. This recommendation
proposes adding significantly greater weight to the
parameters of design simplicity and robustness. The
inaccessibility of satellites once they are in orbit and the
single string design of almost all CubeSats, necessitates
extensive testing for reliability and confidence.
However, if a design is complicated, then even more
time is spent both realizing initial functionality and
subsequently testing for robustness. Add to this the fact
that many CubeSat developers do not have access to
sophisticated analyses and testing.
An often-overlooked aspect of simple design is a
consideration for easy assembly and disassembly.
Despite the best plans and intentions, satellites are often
taken apart. If disassembly is a difficult or lengthy
operation, then that will factor into a decision to fix
something or take a risk to leave it as is.

Recommendation #6: Stock spare components. Extra
boards support parallel software development and are
flight spares. Extra hardware protects schedule
during mechanical testing.
The development of a new system is prone to mistakes.
If hardware is not easy to replace, then an effort must
be made to avoid errors that might damage it.
Unfortunately, extra care most often means that less
testing is done. CubeSat components are not like
traditional space hardware: they cost less and are more
readily available, but their documentation and prior
testing may be lacking. Therefore, purchasing spares is
a cost-effective strategy to protect schedule and to
increase mission assurance through testing. A proposal
for any mission will aim for the lowest cost. However,
even though the cost of labor far exceeds hardware cost,
the hardware budget is often cut. Spare hardware will
save a project money in the long run by protecting
against a schedule slip waiting for damaged hardware to
be repaired. The spare hardware can also be used as

Another aspect of reliable and robust design that is not
given enough respect is the incorporation of respectable
margins, in any configuration for thermal performance,
communications link, and power generation. All are
key to a satellite that will operate in space, at its most
fundamental functional level.
Finally, rounding out the fundamental attributes of a
robust design are simple and tested safe modes,
software reprogrammability and daily satellite resets.
These characteristics will keep a satellite alive long
enough for operators to find and correct issues.
Recommendation #5: Build an experienced team – it
matters. A successful team has veteran member(s)
and frequent informal peer reviews (discussions) with
proven subject matter experts.
Venturini
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another development set for parallel work by the
software team.

CubeSat thermal tests verify that components and
deployments operate properly at temperature and that
heat paths are sufficient to prevent temperatures outside
the working limits of satellite systems. Deployments
and components often behave differently at thermal
extremes than at ambient temperatures. Satellite heat
loads and thermal paths are often not accurately
described to thermal engineers or faithfully achieved in
the satellite build. Also, satellite component loads
become refined during the electronics development
phase, rendering the thermal analysis inaccurate.

Recommendation #7: At a minimum, first perform
these four mission assurance tests: 1) Day-in-the-life
[or longer] testing; 2) Communication link testing
with the ground station; 3) Power system charge /
discharge testing, and 4) Thermal testing (in vacuum
if at all possible). Then, perform the tests that have
the highest risk reduction value for your mission.
A satellite development has many tests that are
performed to verify that it meets requirements.
However, these four tests do more. When combined
with robust design margins, they verify that the satellite
will be functional. Many developers cited these tests as
essential, providing the most “bang for the buck.”

Thermal tests at ambient pressure verify the design
margins on electrical and mechanical subassemblies
when they are operated at the thermal extremes. The
ambient pressure ensures rapid changes and an even
application of temperature. If enough cycles are done,
then it also proves soldering workmanship. It is often
done with the batteries not installed or present because
they severely limit the thermal range of the test.

The day-in-the-life (DITL) test validates that satellite
software is nominally functional, and that the
combination of hardware and software can perform its
basic mission. A mission scenario is simulated, and
commands are generated in the planning software.
Those commands are uploaded to the satellite and
executed automatically with the satellite in a similar
state as expected on orbit. The results are downloaded
at the end of the scenario. The satellite data from the
scenario will include payload data and telemetry that is
inspected to verify that it is “as expected.”

The best “like-you-fly” version of thermal testing
operates the spacecraft in flight-like scenarios in
vacuum at both thermal extremes. This verifies that the
heat loads are properly applied and managed. Using the
test results from thermocouples or onboard telemetry,
the thermal model of the satellite is updated. This is
important because the model is used to simulate a wide
variety of additional configurations and concepts of
operation. This test is often done with the batteries
installed to verify heaters and other battery thermal
safeguards.

The communication link test is between the as-built
flight satellite and a ground station. Separating the
satellite and the ground station by a long distance
provides the bulk of the attenuation, and variable
attenuators provide the rest. A file transfer is initiated
as the link is slowly extinguished. The total path loss at
the limit of the link is the demonstrated range. Make
sure the attenuation demonstrated makes sense – sneak
paths are common in RF test configurations that
simulate long distances. The ground station should be
as identical as the one that will be used in flight (or
better yet, use the real ground equipment), although the
antenna will generally have reduced gain for the shorter
range between the satellite and the ground station for
this test and to reduce the amount of added attenuation.

For all programs, these tests are essential. The
likelihood that the satellite will pass them depends on
how much other quality analysis and testing has already
occurred. In resource constrained programs that can
only afford minimal testing, these tests are a necessary
go/no-go assessment of whether the satellite
performance is acceptable or can be fixed in time for
the delivery to proceed.
Recommendation #8: Maintain a healthy skepticism
on vendor subsystem datasheets. Hold margin on all
performance numbers during design and verify after
receipt.

CubeSats are small enough that the entire satellite
power system can be tested at once. This is an easy yet
powerful test. Expose the satellite to sunlight and
examine the satellite’s telemetry. The batteries must be
shown to charge, and the power coming in from the
solar arrays should be visible in the telemetry. Verify
that the satellite batteries can handle the anticipated
electrical loads when no sunlight is present (eclipse).
Download satellite telemetry during these tests and
verify it is correct.
Venturini

A number of interviewees complained that the
information
in
CubeSat
component
or
subsystem datasheets was insufficient or inaccurate.
The CubeSat subsystem industrial base is young and
many non-military / non-aerospace items haven't been
flight proven. Holding substantial margin will help
cover such limitations. Testing is necessary to confirm
that the purchased component or subsystem will
provide the expected and required performance.
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SUMMARY

6.

The MAIW study conducted an extensive literature
review and interviewed 23 organizations across
government, academia, and industry to identify
common themes and lessons learned from CubeSat
programs. From the data gathered, eight actionable
recommendations were developed to improve mission
success. The team hopes that many CubeSat programs
will find value in the results and implement them in
their future programs.

Johnson-Roth, G., Key Considerations for
Mission Success for Class C/D Mission,
Aerospace Report No. TOR-2013-00294, The
Aerospace Corporation, El Segundo, CA, June
2013.

7.

Robertson, S., L. Harzstark, J. Siplon, et al.,
Parts, Materials, and Processes Control Program
for Space and Launch Vehicles, Aerospace
Report
No.
TOR-2006(8583)-5235,
The
Aerospace Corporation, El Segundo, CA,
November 2006.

8.

Robertson, S., L. Harzstark, J. Siplon, et al.,
Technical Requirements for Electronic Parts,
Materials, and Processes Used in Space and
Launch Vehicles, Aerospace Report No. TOR2006(8583)-5236, The Aerospace Corporation,
El Segundo, CA, November 2006.

The study final report is available to download from the
following website: https://www.nasa.gov/smallsatinstitute/small-spacecraft-body-of-knowledge.
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